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I. INTRODUCTION 
During the early nineteenth century, there was a distinct 
Supreme Court bar, dominated by lawyers in and around Wash-
ington. Travel to the new capital city was difficult, and, rather 
than assume the onerous task of journeying to Washington to ap-
pear before the Justices, many lawyers would refer their cases to 
the litigators in the District of Columbia. Lawyers such as 
Thomas A. Emmet, Francis Scott 'Key, William Pinkney, Lit-
tleton W. Tazewell, Daniel Webster, and William Wirt were 
among the leading lights who served as the early gatekeepers of 
the Court. The advent of more rapid and efficient means of 
transportation, however, supplanted the need for a Washipgton-
based bar, and the integrated group of appellate practitioners 
gave way to a more fluid and geographically diverse set of 
advocates.! 
Today, countless interests tum to lawyers in Washington, 
D.C., for advocacy before the federal government, bu( much of 
that specialized representation is engaged for the pressure poli-
tics of the Congress and regulatory agencies. The consumers of 
such representation are most often pursuing the same basic ob-
jective: securing access to governmental decisionmakers.2 In-
creasingly, however, those who seek access to the U.S. Supreme 
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to Gregory A. Caldeira and John A. Clark for their advice and assistance. 
1. See, for example, John P. Frank, Marble Palace: The Supreme Court in American 
Life 93-95 (Alfred A. Knopf, 1968); Samuel Krislov, The Supreme Court in the Political 
Process 51-54 (Macmillan Company, 1965); Robert G. McCloskey, The American 
Supreme Court 72-73 (U. of Chi. Press, 1960); Charles Warren, A History of the American 
Bar (Howard Fertig, 1966); G. Edward White, The Marshall Court and Cultural Change, 
1815-35 201-291 (Oxford U. Press, 1991); James Sterling Young, The Washington Commu-
nity 1800-1828 (Colum. U. Press, 1966). 
2. Jeffrey M. Berry, The Interest Group Society (Little, Brown & Co., 1984); Kay 
Lehman Schlozman and John T. Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy 
(Harper & Row, 1986). 
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Court have once again begun to follow the same general pattern 
of tapping Washington-based expertise-lawyers in the capital 
community who emphasize appellate litigation. So pronounced 
is this apparent trend, one observer noted, that today "there 
seems to be forming, if it has not already, a new (unofficial) 
Supreme Court bar in which Washington lawyers once again play 
a starring role. "3 Has the Washington bar actually regained a 
dominant position in Supreme Court politics? Which among 
these litigators can be thought of as genuine members of the 
"Supreme Court bar"? And do these lawyers, like other special-
ists, serve the same function of gaining access to policy makers? 
To answer these questions, I draw upon several sources of 
data. First, to assay the profile of the most active members of the 
Supreme Court bar, I gathered information on those lawyers who 
participated in multiple cases decided on the merits from the 
1977 Term to the 1982 Term. For these lawyers, I collected dem-
ographic information as well as data relating to both their gen-
eral practices and the nature and extent of their specific litigation 
activities in the Court during that time period. These data were 
taken from several sources, including the United States Reports, 
Briefs and Records of the United States Supreme Court, and vari-
ous editions of the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory. Second, 
as a means of gauging which lawyers are regarded as expert 
Supreme Court advocates, I conducted a mail survey of a sample 
of Supreme Court practitioners in which I asked respondents to 
nominate from among their peers those they felt were the 
Court's best litigators.4 Third, to analyze the effect of these nota-
bles as modem gatekeepers of the Court, I examine their impact 
on the Supreme Court's selection of cases from paid petitions for 
the writ of certiorari during the 1982 Term. In addition, to pro-
vide some contextual foundation for this study, I interviewed, on 
3. John Greenya, Supreme Lawyers, The Washington Lawyer 35 (May/June 1987); 
Arthur S. Hayes, Supreme Court Specialty: Does It Work?, The American Lawyer 65 
(June 1989); Eleanor Kerlow, Supreme Payoff for Clerks: $35,000 Bonus, The Legal limes 
of Washington 1 (Sept. 17, 1990); Stephen Wermiel, More Litigants Turn to Appeals Spe-
cialists, Wall Street Journal at B3 (July 5, 1989). 
4. Specifically, I drew a systematic random sample of non-federal government law-
yers who represented both petitioners and respondents at the agenda stage of the 
Supreme Court during the 1986-87 Term. Of approximately 700 potential respondents, 
nearly fifty percent returned a questionnaire. These data are fairly representative, given 
that different types of counsel-for example, private practitioners, lawyers in state and 
local government, corporate in-house counsel, and so on-responded in almost the same 
proportions in which they were sampled. The survey asked each respondent to name up 
to five lawyers whom he or she regarded as distinctive by virtue of their practice in the 
Supreme Court. 
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an anonymous basis, nineteen active Supreme Court 
practitioners. 
Briefly, the results demonstrate that lawyers within the 
Washington community, comprising a substantial component of 
the bar of the Court, generally are viewed as the Court's pre-
miere litigators. Moreover, the certiorari petitions brought by 
these lawyers enjoy a significant advantage as the Justices con-
struct their plenary agenda. Thus, just as the lawyers in Washing-
ton are better able to gain access to members of the legislative 
and executive branches, so too are they more effective in gaining 
access to the judicial branch. 
II. WASHINGTON LAWYERS AND THE SUPREME 
COURT BAR 
Between 1977 and 1982, roughly 4,000 lawyers formally par-
ticipated in the fully-argued cases that the Supreme Court de-
cided on the merits.s For many it was probably their first and last 
appearance before the Justices. Still, even within that relatively 
short time period, some fifteen percent appeared in more than 
one case. In fact, this small percentage-which I will call the 
"experienced" Supreme Court bar-actually commanded a hefty 
portion of the representation in the Supreme Court, making half 
of all formal appearances by counsel. Who were these lawyers? 
As one might suspect, a substantial number of the lawyers 
with multiple cases are governmental representatives. A quarter 
of them work for the federal government, while about the same 
percentage serve state and local governments. An additional 
eleven percent work for organized interests, while the ranks of 
academia, corporate in-house counsel, and legal aid or public de-
fender programs each contribute roughly two percent. The law-
yers making the single largest contribution to this group, 
however, are private practitioners, nearly one third of the exper-
ienced bar. Although these private counsel hail from regions 
across the country, fifty percent of them work in a single geo-
graphic location-Washington, D.C. 
Table 1, which presents data on the primary urban locations 
of the experienced Supreme Court counsel, reinforces the view 
that Washington is the principal city in which active members of 
the Court's bar practice; the number of lawyers in the District of 
5. By formal participation, I mean that they were given official recognition in the 
United States Reports, listed as having argued the cause or as having appeared on the brief 
with the attorney who did argue the case. Specifically, there were 3915 different lawyers, 
of whom 709 appeared more than once. 
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TABLE 1. PRINCIPAL LOCATIONS OF EXPERIENCED 
MEMBERS OF SUPREME COURT BAR 
All lawyers Percent Private practice only Percent 
Washington 43.0 Washington 47.8 
New York 9.4 New York 10.7 
Chicago 5.4 Chicago 7.8 
Los Angeles 3.2 Los Angeles 3.4 
San Francisco 2.7 Phoenix 2.4 
Austin 2.0 Philadelphia 2.0 
Atlanta 1.7 San Francisco 2.0 
Boston 1.6 Minneapolis/St. Paul 1.5 
Phoenix 1.6 Houston 1.0 
Minneapolis/St. Paul 1.3 Pittsburgh 1.0 
N = 709 N = 205 
Columbia, some forty-three percent, towers above the propor-
tion of counsel from virtually every other locale. This clearly is 
not a reflection of the bar at large, since Washington, New York, 
and Chicago have more or less comparable shares of the total 
lawyer population.6 It is true, of course, that Washington's dis-
proportionately large percentage is, at least in part, a function of 
the wealth of federal government attorneys who work in Wash-
ington and appear in the Court. The federal government's coun-
sel, however, do not tell the whole story; a substantial segment of 
the Washington lawyers (32%) work in private practice. 
Among the private practitioners, Washington still maintains 
a commanding presence. This is particularly noteworthy, given 
that so few lawyers in the District of Columbia practice privately: 
less than forty percent of all Washington lawyers are in private 
practice, in comparison to seventy percent of the lawyers in both 
New York and Chicago.? Overall, the private lawyers in Wash-
ington comprise nearly half of all the Court's experienced private 
litigators. These data illustrate quite strikingly the centrality of 
Washington as the nation's legal center. Moreover, many of the 
cases that end up in the Supreme Court are products of the 
Courts of Appeals for both the District of Columbia and the Fed-
eral Circuits; many litigants are likely to turn to local counsel for 
6. Barbara A. Curran, Katherine J. Rosich, Clara N. Carson, and Mark C. Puccetti, 
The Lawyer Statistical Report: A Statistical Profile of the U.S. Legal Profession in the 1980s 
(American Bar Foundation, 1985). 
7. See id. 
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representation in these appellate courts and retain them for any 
subsequent work in the Supreme Court. Finally, and perhaps 
most obviously, the Court itself is in Washington, and, when cli-
ents have cases before the Supreme Court, they may perceive the 
need to have genuine Supreme Court specialists and conse-
quently look to the firms that work in the Court's shadow.s 
Clearly, not all Supreme Court counsel are located in Wash-
ington. One should not, however, lose sight of the concentration 
of experienced litigators in the capital relative to that of other 
cities. On the one hand, fifty percent of the most experienced 
Supreme Court lawyers work in cities other than Washington. 
On the other hand, the cities making even a modest contribution 
to the Court's bar, when taken together, do not begin to ap-
proach the lion's share that Washington commands. Of course, 
this concentration by itself does not tell us anything about the 
relative effectiveness of these lawyers. After all, just because 
parties turn disproportionately to Washington counsel when liti-
gating before the Justices does not mean that those lawyers pro-
vide qualitatively better representation. Whether certain types 
of lawyers can be regarded as more effective-as expert 
Supreme Court practitioners-is a topic to which I now turn. 
III. SOURCES OF THE BAR'S REPUTATION 
When the American Truckers Association needed represen-
tation in the Supreme Court, to whom did they turn? The Chi-
cago-based firm of Mayer, Brown & Platt. Why? "We wanted 
the best," said their chief counsel.9 What would make such a 
firm "the best" when it comes to litigating in the Court? Why is 
it, precisely, that some lawyers are regarded as true Supreme 
Court counsel while others garner no similar favorable reputa-
tions? In short, why are some lawyers viewed as Supreme Court 
practitioners? There is probably no formula for acquiring the 
status of a true Supreme Court lawyer, but we can probably ac-
count for some of the considerations that contribute to it. 
8. Elsewhere, I reported that this representation of private Washington counsel has 
evinced steady growth in recent decades: at the case selection stage, for example, only one 
percent of all petitions for review in the Court in 1940 were filed by Washington law 
firms; some twenty-five years later, however, Washington's share of the Supreme Court 
bar had increased ten-fold. Indeed, the number of cases brought to the Court by the 
Washington firms in 1985 was more than the combined number filed by law firms in New 
York and Chicago, cities that together have four times as many private practitioners than 
Washington. See Kevin T. McGuire, Lawyers and the U.S. Supreme Court: The Washing-
ton Community and Legal Elites, 37 Am. J. of Pol. Sci. 365 (1993). 
9. Hayes, The American Lawyer at 65 (cited in note 3). 
272 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 11:267 
Scholars of the legal profession have investigated similar is-
sues. In one important work, for example, Heinz and Laumann 
examined the social hierarchy of the Chicago bar.w In their 
study, they asked the respondents whether they knew several of 
Chicago's most notable practitioners. This proved to be very ef-
fective in characterizing the stratification within the bar. Draw-
ing upon their analysis, I employed a similar strategy in my 
investigation of effectiveness within the Supreme Court bar: I 
asked the Supreme Court practitioners themselves to nominate 
litigators whom they regarded as the Court's expert advocates, 
and they responded by nominating 166 different litigators as 
skilled Supreme Court counsel. 
Why were these lawyers selected? What factors motivated 
the respondents to name these particular litigators as genuine 
Supreme Court practitioners? A good way to answer this ques-
tion is to see if those who were selected appeared in the 1977-82 
data and, if so, what distinguished them from other experienced 
lawyers. Of those who were nominated, some 57 were present in 
the 1977-82 data set on experienced lawyers. By confining the 
data set to lawyers with multiple participation on the merits dur-
ing those years, I set a fairly rigorous threshold for lawyers to 
meet. Nevertheless, over a third were able to do so. Lawyers 
who were named as experts but who had less than two cases dur-
ing that period were eliminated.u Of those lawyers who were 
named as Supreme Court experts, some were nominated only 
once; others were mentioned several times. Among the roughly 
one dozen lawyers who were nominated most frequently were 
William T. Coleman, Jr., Archibald Cox, Laurence Gold, Erwin 
Griswold, Rex Lee, E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., and Laurence 
Tribe-by virtually any standard, luminaries within the bar na-
tionally. What is striking about those named most often is the 
degree of professional continuity between them: four are alumni 
of the Solicitor General's office; six served as clerks to Supreme 
Court Justices; six are affiliated with large law firms, all of them 
in Washington. In sum, Washington is or was home to eight of 
them. Supreme Court lawyers are well aware of their profes-
10. See John P. Heinz and Edward 0. Laumann, Chicago Lawyers: The Social Struc-
ture of the Bar 274-315 (Russell Sage Foundation and American Bar Foundation, 1982). 
11. Note the time span between the 1977-82 data and this survey, which was con-
ducted in 1990. When looking for the presence of skilled lawyers among the 1977-82 
data, one may not find some of them, since a fair number of notables may have ~evelo~d 
their reputations subsequent to 1982. Furthermore, even those who were active dunng 
that six year period may have been involved in even more cases in the intervening years. 
Thus, the analysis may be underestimating the relationship between experience and skill. 
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sional integration. As one alumnus of the Solicitor General's of-
fice told me, "I think if you look at the folks who have a practice 
in front of the Supreme Court, they have fairly common 
backgrounds." 
The similarities shared by these lawyers provide some clues 
as to which litigators are apt to be seen as the bar's most effective 
members. Across the full range of experienced advocates, for ex-
ample, Supreme Court clerks and alumni of the Solicitor Gen-
eral's office might be seen by their peers as more effective 
Supreme Court counsel. Likewise, lawyers in the law firms in 
Washington might be viewed as more closely connected to the 
Court-and thus more effective-than the private practitioners 
in other cities. Since the Washington legal community is appar-
ently so central for Supreme Court counsel, it may be worthwhile 
to examine the professional reputations of lawyers both in and 
out of Washington, D.C. These potential influences can be uti-
lized to provide a more systematic account of why lawyers ac-
quire expert status. 
An overview of the lawyers with reputations as expert 
Supreme Court counsel is presented in Table 2. I have divided 
the data on experienced lawyers into Washington and non-Wash-
TABLE 2. REPUTATIONS AS NOTABLE SUPREME 
COURT COUNSEL FOR SELECTED CATEGORIES 
OF LAWYERS 
Experienced Non-Washington counsel Percent N 
Academic lawyers 23.1 13 
Interest group lawyers 12.7 55 
Corporate counsel 7.7 13 
Firm lawyers 6.5 107 
State and local government 4.0 200 
All lawyers 7.0 388 
Experienced Washington counsel 
Alumni of Solicitor General's office 50.0 10 
Former Supreme Court clerks 30.4 46 
Interest group lawyers 20.0 20 
Lawyers in Solicitor General's office 18.2 44 
Firm lawyers 16.3 98 
All lawyers 17.9 179 
ington categories. Within those two groups, I examine the most 
common types of practitioners-academic lawyers, counsel to 
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state and local government, interest group litigators, and law firm 
counsel. I also distinguish those who have been previously 
linked to the Court in an immediate way-alumni of the Solicitor 
General's office and former Supreme Court clerks. Within each 
group I report the proportion of lawyers who were named as 
Supreme Court experts. Finally, I calculate the overall percent-
age of notables in and out of Washington. These data show stark 
contrasts in the distribution of Supreme Court experts. This 
stands to reason; not everyone can be seen as influential. Still, 
some kinds of lawyers have considerably greater degrees of 
reputational status as members of the Supreme Court bar. Why? 
Among the lawyers who work outside of Washington, only 
seven percent are thought of as expert counsel. In general, their 
distribution of notable Supreme Court lawyers is fairly con-
strained: in three categories of non-Washington counsel, less than 
ten percent of their membership are noted as influential in the 
Court. Of those three, one group has less than five percent of its 
peers elevated to expert status. Clearly, there are leaders within 
the Supreme Court bar who do not practice in the capital; in 
large measure, however, they are concentrated among two 
groups, law professors and attorneys for organized interests.l2 
Among academic lawyers, there are a number of distin-
guished members of the legal professoriate who are nominated 
for influential status: Alan Dershowitz, Eugene Gressman, Lau-
rence Tribe, and Charles Alan Wright are among the law profes-
sors named. In the interview setting, lawyers frequently 
volunteered admiration for their work. For example, one law 
professor, also a Supreme Court practitioner, said, "In my course 
on the Supreme Court, I always play the tape of Charles Alan 
Wright's argument in San Antonio v. Rodriguez to my students. 
I think it's one of the best arguments I've ever heard." Counsel 
to organized interests are held in similar high regard. Names like 
Laurence Gold of the AFL-CIO, Jack Greenberg and Julius 
Chambers of the NAACP Legal Defense Fund, and Burt 
Neuborne of the ACLU are among the more common nominees 
for notable Supreme Court practitioners.t3 Again, the 
12. The reader might note that there are academic lawyers in Washington, some of 
whom litigate in the Court. In this sample, however, only one was in Washington. The 
same can also be said of corporate counsel; not a single corporate lawyer with extensive 
Supreme Court experience practices in Washington. Accordingly, I have classified them 
as non-Washington attorneys. 
13. Since there are experienced interest group lawyers both in and out of Washing-
ton, I have computed the proportions with Supreme Court reputations accordingly. 
Although the organized interest counsel in Washington have slightly more Supreme 
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reputations of interest group advocates in the Court are well-
known.l4 
In contrast, the lawyers who represent state governments 
and corporations are among the lawyers least likely to be consid-
ered as notables. For lawyers in either of these two groups to be 
named as leaders of the Supreme Court bar is a rarity; only four 
percent and eight percent of their respective members were sin-
gled out as influential counsel. Neither finding is scarcely sur-
prising, since both types of counsel have traditionally not fared 
well in the high court.ls Thus, when it comes to Supreme Court 
practice, they garner less notice from their colleagues. 
Are the lawyers in Washington viewed as any more influen-
tial in the Supreme Court than those who work elsewhere? 
Again, Table 2 provides us with the clear answer. Even the most 
conservative assessment of these data would lead one to con-
clude that Washington lawyers are far more likely to be tapped 
for their Supreme Court expertise.16 The proportion of private 
practitioners in Washington who have reputations as effective 
counsel, for example, is twice as large as the percentage of the 
private bar in other cities. Specifically, sixteen percent of the ex-
perienced Supreme Court litigators in Washington are notables; 
only seven percent of the non-Washington lawyers have earned 
reputations. Obviously, many litigants respond to this perception 
by seeking out the Washington bar's expertise, as one lawyer's 
comments illustrate. "In the cases that I've been involved in, the 
sense was that the local attorneys didn't really have-or at least 
perceived that they didn't have-the skills to handle the case, 
and therefore they sought out Washington counsel." This is not 
to suggest, of course, that merely practicing in Washington will 
Court notables, the difference suggests that any value that interest group lawyers receive 
from working in Washington is incremental in nature. 
14. See, for example, Lee Epstein, Conservatives in Court (U. Tennessee Press, 
1985); Richard Kluger, Simple Justice: The History of Brown v. Board of Education and 
Black America's Struggle for Equality (Alfred A. Knopf, 1976); Susan E. Lawrence, The 
Poor in Court: The Legal Services Program and Supreme Court Decision Making 
(Princeton U. Press, 1990); Doris Marie Provine, Case Selection in the United States 
Supreme Court (U. of Chi. Press, 1980); Frank J. Sorauf, The Wall of Separation: The 
Constitutional Politics of Church and State (Princeton U. Press, 1976). 
15. Larry Lempert, DOl Loans Lawyer to NAAG to Follow High Court, The Legal 
Times of Washington 2 (Aug. 30, 1982); Tony Mauro, Corporate Lawyer "Quayles" Before 
Court, The Legal Times of Washington 8 (Oct. 24, 1988); H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to 
Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court 127 (Harv. U. Press, 1991); Cf. 
Lee Epstein and Karen O'Connor, States and the U.S. Supreme Court: An Examination of 
Litigation Outcomes, 69 Soc. Sci. Q. 660 (1988). 
16. Note that the total number of all experienced Washington counsel is less than 
the sum of the individual categories because some lawyers may fall into more than one 
group. Many former clerks, for instance, are also in Washington law firms. 
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earn one a reputation as an effective Court litigator. At the very 
least, however, a private practitioner in Washington, with a few 
Supreme Court cases to his credit, has a greater chance of being 
perceived as more closely connected to the daily workings of the 
Court. 
Another set of Washington practitioners, members of the 
Solicitor General's staff, have reputations in roughly the same 
proportion as the attorneys in Washington law firms. The influ-
ence of the Solicitor General is, of course, well-documented,t7 
and it is not necessary to justify either the Solicitor General's 
successes or his reputation. Still, the percentage of lawyers on 
the Solicitor General's staff who have earned the status of expert 
Supreme Court counsel may strike one as low. Consider, how-
ever, that the reputation carried by that office is largely institu-
tional in nature. Lawyers hold the office itself in very high 
esteem, yet they are hard pressed to name individual members 
whom they consider to be distinctive practitioners. This is cer-
tainly not to suggest that the lawyers who comprise that office 
are not among the brightest legal minds who practice before the 
Court; quite the contrary. Most lawyers, however, apparently do 
not know who they are.ts 
The most effective advocates, in the eyes of the bar, are 
those lawyers who have left the Solicitor General's office and 
have used their extensive experience with the Court as a means 
of attracting potential Supreme Court clients. One lawyer 
explained: 
The most common reason lawyers develop a Supreme Court 
practice is my reason, which is that they've served in the solici-
tor general's office. They've acquired a lot of experience with 
the Court. They know how the Court works. They know what 
kind of arguments they make. They know how to write things 
that are likely to be persuasive to the Court. It therefore 
makes a lot of sense for clients with cases they care about to 
retain people like that. Unlike a lot of other areas, it's not as 
easy to become an experienced Supreme Court practitioner. 
17. See, for example, Gregory A. Caldeira and John R. Wright, Organized Interests 
and Agenda Setting in the U.S. Supreme Court, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 1109 (1988); Lincoln 
Caplan, The Tenth Justice: The Solicitor General and the Rule of Law (Alfred A. Knopf, 
1987); Provine, Case Selection in the United States Supreme Court (cited in note 14); Jef-
frey A. Segal and Cheryl D. Reedy, The Supreme Court and Sex Discrimination: The Role 
of the Solicitor General, 41 Western Pol. Q. 553 (1988). 
18. Among the survey respondents, for example, a fair number of lawyers listed 
"Lawyers in the solicitor general's office" as expert Supreme Court counsel. Frequently, 
they volunteered that they did not know them by name. 
1994) SUPREME COURT BAR 
There's sort of one place where you can really do it, and that's 
the solicitor general's office. 
277 
It is important to consider these former associates of the Solicitor 
General's staff in the context of Washington counsel, because, as 
the 1977-82 data vividly convey, Washington is where most of 
them are to be found: in only one instance in this sample did a 
former associate of the Solicitor General practice law in a city 
other than Washington.19 
Like the alumni of the Solicitor General's office, many of 
former clerks to the Justices end up practicing law in Washington 
following their tenure with the Court.2o Not surprisingly, nearly 
eighty percent of the Supreme Court clerks who later appear 
before the Justices are Washington attorneys. Why consider 
Supreme Court clerks in the context of the specialized Supreme 
Court bar? The answer is that a Supreme Court clerkship affords 
the young lawyer an insider's view of the machinations of the 
Court. This in tum has implications for a lawyer's ability to pro-
vide knowledgeable representation once he or she moves on to 
practice law. Clerks, having screened petitions for review and 
acquired a taste for plausible arguments the Court will likely find 
appealing, can likely lend a critical eye to petitions they encoun-
ter in private practice. The interviews are chock full of state-
ments about the importance of having served as Supreme Court 
clerks in precisely this context. As one former clerk told me: 
Being a clerk is most helpful, I think, in the certiorari pro-
cess-knowing how petitions are reviewed, what role law 
clerks play versus the justices, or knowing who's your audi-
ence and what are the constraints on your audience. I think 
that's a terribly important piece of knowledge to have. If you 
know what it's like to try to go through a hundred cert peti-
tions a week and make sense of them, if you understand that 
and think about what the reader is doing, it ought to signifi-
cantly alter what you're trying to say to them .... It's kind of 
like the electronic sound bite. To a certain extent, what you 
do has to be designed in the same way, because the person 
you're writing for does not have the time to sit there and think 
great thoughts about what you're writing. He or she has to 
19. As I noted earlier, several of the alumni of the Solicitor General's office cur-
rently work in the Chicago office of Mayer, Brown. The reason they do not show up in 
the 1977-82 data set is that many were still in the Solicitor General's office during this 
period. That some practice in Chicago does not detract from the larger point. Alumni of 
the Solicitor General's office clearly prefer Washington. 
20. Susan E. Grogan, Judicial Apprentices? Law Clerks in the United States, paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Washing-
ton, DC (1991). 
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make a judgment almost immediately, and you're writing for 
that purpose. So I think that part helps. Having seen the 
other side of it and knowing which kinds of submissions were 
not helpful to me, I think, is a plus-a big plus. 
There can be little doubt that these lawyers are a highly valued 
asset, particularly to those that aspire to Supreme Court practice, 
as evidenced by the willingness of many firms to offer clerks lu-
crative signing bonuses.21 
Experiences such as these, when taken together, ought to 
provide the makings of the prototypical Supreme Court practi-
tioner. Thus, for example, the Washington lawyer with the per-
spective of a former clerk and experience in the Solicitor 
General's office arguably should know, as well as or better than 
anyone, how to provide effective representation before the 
Court, as this litigator explains: 
To my mind, the ideal Supreme Court lawyer is somebody 
who clerked on the Supreme Court, was in private practice for 
a time, and then went to the solicitor general's office where he 
rose to become a deputy solicitor general and has since been 
out for a relatively short period of time. All things being 
equal, that person ought to be a very good Supreme Court 
lawyer. 
Of course, these attributes are only imperfect indicators of genu-
ine skill in advocacy. Clearly, there is no guarantee that such 
lawyers would be any more effective than those who come from 
different backgrounds. Any lawyer who litigates in the Supreme 
Court has a reasonable chance of earning a reputation for excel-
lence in advocacy; what these results reflect, though, is that, 
among the lawyers who practice there, those who are tethered 
most closely to the Court-clerks, the Solicitor General's alumni, 
and those who work in immediate proximity to the Court-obvi-
ously have a much greater advantage when it comes to develop-
ing reputations for skillful representation. 
That such a large proportion of Supreme Court practitioners 
locate themselves in Washington and that so many of those who 
do have substantial reputations for advocacy are findings well 
worth reporting. Still, whether these counsel have any effect on 
the decision making of the Court remains an open matter. Are 
those who are regarded as "insiders" any more effective than 
those who are not? 
21. See Kerlow, The Legal Times of Washington at 1 (cited in note 3); see also 
Hayes, The American Lawyer at 65 (cited in note 3); Wermiel, Wall Street Journal at 83 
(cited in note 3). 
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IV. THE SUPREME COURT BAR AS GATEKEEPERS 
Quite often, the individuals in Washington who advocate 
causes before decision makers are sought because they can more 
effectively give voice to the interests they represent. The princi-
pal reason why these specialists are sought "is to gain access to 
those members of Congress or executive branch officials to 
whom the client does not have easy entree."22 In the Supreme 
Court, precious few, aside from the Solicitor General, enjoy easy 
entree: the Supreme Court guards its gates rather closely, grant-
ing review to but a handful of the thousands of petitions it re-
ceives annually. Can we generalize about what is known 
regarding the reliance upon specialists in legislative and execu-
tive politics to the federal judiciary? Are the expert Supreme 
Court counsel any more effective at gaining access (i.e., securing 
plenary review from the Justices) than other lawyers, and, if so, 
why? 
To begin with, there is a theoretical nexus between the qual-
ity of a certiorari petition and its likelihood of persuading the 
Justices to grant review. Many petitions that are brought to the 
Court are disadvantaged because their authors lack a sense of 
how to construct compelling petitions. Many lawyers who are 
new to the Court hammer out briefs that are simply not up to the 
task of demonstrating cert-worthiness. 
In hundreds of cases each year the private litigant is repre-
sented by a lawyer whose brief reveals that he has no notion at 
all of the requisites of Supreme Court litigation or of what is 
and what is not persuasive to the Court to which the brief is 
addressed. These are the cases that never get to argument be-
cause by its preliminary order, the Court disposes of them.23 
Hence, logical briefs have a greater chance of persuading the 
Court than disorganized, implausible ones, and it is here where 
veteran counsel could have an edge. One lawyer, formerly of the 
Solicitor General's office and now in private practice, provides 
the following illustration: 
Say you have a party that has a case that's litigated in the 
lower courts-the party could be a big company, a wealthy 
individual, or some organization-and somebody with influ-
ence on the party comes along and says, "This case is impor-
22. Schlozman and Tierney, Organized Interests and American Democracy at 100 
(cited in note 2) (emphasis in original). 
23. Frank, Marble Palace: The Supreme Court in American Life at 95 (cited in note 
1). 
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tant to you; you ought to have a Supreme Court specialist 
handle it." And the art of getting the Supreme Court to re-
view a case is a somewhat special artist thing. So they bring in 
Supreme Court counsel. Now, that may be true even though 
very competent counsel has handled the case in the lower 
courts. But when they get to the Supreme Court, some clients 
feel that there are lawyers who have a lot of experience with 
the Supreme Court and that they ought to use them. 
This is not to suggest, of course, that inexperienced counsel will, 
of necessity, have every petition denied or that expert litigators 
can guarantee success. On balance, however, the inexperienced 
lawyer must overcome the burdens of the unfamiliar, and thus 
the odds are against him. 
Perhaps even more significant to the process of case selec-
tion are the reputations that the Court's notable advocates pos-
sess. When a lawyer who is known to the Justices lends his or her 
name to a petition, the attorney conveys an implicit message to 
the Court: these arguments can be taken seriously and the issues 
raised are worthy of the your attention. Scholars of the Court 
have demonstrated, over and over again, that the Justices give 
great weight to the arguments made by the institutional litigants 
who come before them. By extension, as the Justices come to 
know the experienced lawyers who practice before them, the sea-
soned advocates develop comparable credibility. Lawyers them-
selves, then, become repeat players.24 Thus, the relationship of 
lawyer credibility to the process of case selection should be obvi-
ous: the petition bearing the name of an experienced member of 
the Supreme Court bar may be a harbinger of a potentially cert-
worthy case. As the lawyers who litigate in the Court with fre-
quency admit, they place great weight on their credibility in the 
Court and, consequently, are reluctant to advance unreasonable 
claims. Here is how one practitioner in a large firm speaks to this 
issue, as he discusses how one of his partners-a former member 
of the Solicitor General's office-works to protect his and his 
firm's reputation with the Court. 
He doesn't put his name on a case to take an otherwise un-
certworthy issue and create a Supreme Court case out of it. In 
fact, I've seen him tell clients he won't put his name on a peti-
tion because it's not a case that's worth going up there. Since 
24. Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limils 
of Legal Change, 9 Law & Society Rev. 96 (1974). Galanter considers lawyers as poten-
tial repeat players, and, like all repeat players, credibility is one of the advantages that 
they enjoy. 
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he thinks it has no realistic prospect of being granted, he just 
won't put his name on the pleading. 
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Any lawyer who submits a petition for review obviously wants 
the Court to take his case seriously, but the notable Supreme 
Court advocates also have long-term interests at stake. They 
want to maintain their practice in the Court, remain visible, at-
tract future Supreme Court clients, and so on. None of these 
goals are well-served by alienating the Justices and losing their 
trust. Spending all of one's political capital on any given case 
simply does not outweigh the broader interests associated with 
the reputation for effective appellate advocacy. These lawyers 
see themselves in long-term relationships with the Court. As one 
notable lawyer puts it: 
I would say that people like [Erwin] Griswold, Larry Tribe, I 
hope myself, and certainly Rex Lee bring something special to 
the Court. I guess the one thing is-particularly if you come 
out of the solicitor general's practice-that the Court has con-
fidence that you will never overstate the case. And that is 
something important. 
Are the lawyers who have reputations for effective advocacy 
in the Court truly gatekeepers? Does retaining a notable practi-
tioner increase the likelihood that the Court will grant review? 
And do the veteran members of the bar in the Washington com-
munity enjoy any particular advantages? One way to address 
these issues is to examine which lawyers petition the Court, as 
well as how much experience they have had practicing before it, 
to see if the petitions of the notable Iitigators in Washington re-
ceive differential treatment. If lawyers have the effect that they 
themselves claim, then the participation of lawyers who are re-
garded as the most credible-especially those in the District of 
Columbia-should have an impact on the selection of subse-
quent cases for plenary review. To test these assumptions, I 
have, for the 1982 Term, determined: 1) which of those petitions 
for certiorari were brought by active notable lawyers, and 2) the 
average number of cases on the merits in which the petitioners' 
counsel were active during the previous five terms.25 Data on 
their effect on the Supreme Court's selection of cases are 
presented in Table 3. 
Deciding to give full review in the Court is a complex pro-
cess, and many influences doubtless evade this general overview. 
25. If, for example, a petition was filed by three lawyers, of whom two had earlier 
cases from 1977 to 1981, I simply took the average of the two lawyers' previous cases. 
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TABLE 3. EFFECT OF SUPREME COURT BAR ON 
CASE SELECTION 
Type of experienced lawyers Granted Denied N 
No Washington lawyer 7.5 92.5 1665 
Washington lawyer 16.3 83.7 92 
No notable lawyer 7.6 92.4 1772 
Notable lawyer 25.7 74.3 35 
No notable Washington lawyer 7.6 92.4 1726 
Notable Washington lawyer 29.0 71.0 31 
Still, it is well worth noting that the experienced counsel in Wash-
ington have their petitions granted at twice the rate of other peti-
tions. This is not a manifestation of the Solicitor General's 
sponsorship of litigation, since his participation has been ex-
cluded from these measures of reputation and experience. So, 
quite apart from the Court's preeminent practitioner, other ex-
perienced lawyers in Washington are better able to gain access to 
the Court's docket. The importance of propinquity to the Court 
is reflected by a member of the Solicitor General's staff: 
As I have practiced before the Court over the years, I find that 
I am better able to anticipate what the justices are likely to be 
interested in about the case, what they may question me 
about, and so forth. I'm just a closer student of the Court in 
that way, because I have constant exposure. To a lesser ex-
tent, that's true of lawyers who practice more regularly before 
the Court but may work out of Chicago or Los Angeles or 
wherever they are. They don't really see the Court in action, 
but on rare occasions. 
Thus, the seasoned members of the appellate bar in Washington 
are more apt to be integrated into the environment of the Court. 
Not surprisingly, their pleadings secure favorable attention. In 
addition, the lawyers who have garnered reputations among their 
peers for effective advocacy in the Court would appear to have 
earned them; roughly twenty-six percent of their petitions were 
granted. These lawyers attribute their success to the members of 
the Court placing special trust in the reliability in their judgment. 
If, for example, the Justices had two cases raising similar legal 
issues, they might give greater weight to the expert's petition. As 
one frequent practitioner in the Court explained: 
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From what I can tell-and this is anecdotal, what you hear 
from people-when the Court is deciding whether to exercise 
its discretion, the idea that they will have a known quantity in 
front of them, whom they can count on to make not necessar-
ily winning arguments but to make good arguments, to do 
thorough research, and to help the Court as much as possible, 
consistent with their client's position, that's a plus in deciding 
whether to take a particular case or to take one case when 
there are two or three that present the same issue. 
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The unique effectiveness of the experienced notables within the 
Washington community is particularly apparent; their success 
rate of thirty percent is even more impressive. In short, reputa-
tions for performing sound and solid work in the Court loom 
large in identifying potentially important cases. One of the 
Washington experts illustrates these findings: 
I think that if you are known to the Court as a Supreme Court 
practitioner-if you're thought of as competent and if they've 
learned over time that when you say, for instance, "It's a direct 
conflict," it is a direct conflict, that it's not strained-whether 
they agree with you or not, they know that what you say is 
going to be credible and supported by the record. They're not 
going to get embarrassed down the line and have to dismiss 
cert as improvidently granted because you were stretching on 
whether an issue was properly briefed and presented. I think 
that helps enormously at the cert stage in getting careful re-
view. Enormously. I'm not trying to get you to retain me, so I 
can say this without sounding immodest about it: Hiring a law-
yer at the cert stage who has a reputation at the Supreme 
Court for playing by the Court's rules is one of the most im-
portant things a client can do in terms of getting attention paid 
to his cert petition. 
Another way to reinforce the argument that the litigation 
experience of the Washington notables breeds a special credibil-
ity with the members of the Court is to look at how their ability 
to secure review varies depending on the amount of their prior 
experience in the Court. The substantial variation in the fortunes 
of the reputation lawyers in Washington can be seen in Table 4. 
The likelihood of certiorari being granted increases substantially 
with each successive case. Thus, within the Washington bar, the 
notables who served as counsel on a single case on the merits 
during the preceding five terms successfully sought certiorari in 
thirteen percent of their cases. This figure doubles for those with 
two cases, and, for those with more than three cases, the rate is 
nearly forty percent. Naturally, the ultimate success or failure of 
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TABLE 4. EFFECf OF SUPREME COURT EXPERIENCE 
ON CASE SELECTION FOR NOTABLE 
WASHINGTON LAWYERS 
Prior experience of notable 
Washington lawyer Granted Denied N 
No notable Washington lawyer 7.6 92.4 1726 
One previous case 12.5 87.5 8 
Two previous cases 28.6 71.4 7 
Three previous cases 33.3 66.7 3 
More than three previous cases 38.5 61.5 13 
any petition turns on the importance of the questions it raises. In 
a fair number of cases, however, the petitioner's lawyer is simply 
better at articulating these issues, as a former associate of the 
Solicitor General explains: 
When they open the brief and start reading it, I think it's more 
what's written on the page than who wrote it that's important. 
Although, lawyers acquire reputations; there is an element of 
credibility, and if the Court feels from knowing you that you 
don't make arguments you don't believe in, they may give it a 
little more weight. In general, I think the most important 
thing is how to get the Justices to pay attention to your brief. 
And my guess is that credibility does matter. Once they start 
to read the brief, it's the quality of the brief that largely is 
going to matter to them. 
Naturally, the data do not begin to capture the other impor-
tant forces-conflict, the significance of the issue, the ideological 
direction of the lower court, to name but a few-that guide the 
agenda-building process.26 What can be said, however, is that 
among the thousands of lawyers who petition the Court for re-
view, the experts in Washington with whom the Court interacts 
most frequently are those who carry the greatest weight. There 
are, of course, alternative interpretations that could be brought 
to these findings. Nonetheless, to the extent that they do reason-
ably reflect reality, these results fit nicely with the theoretical as-
sumptions regarding the consequences of relying upon specialists 
in Washington for governmental advocacy: experienced Supreme 
26. Caldeira and Wright, 82 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. at 1109 (cited in note 17); Perry, 
Deciding to Decide: Agenda Setting in the United States Supreme Court (cited in note 15); 
S. Sidney Ulmer, The Supreme Court's Certiorari Decisions: Conflict as a Predictive Varia-
ble, 78 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 901 (1984). 
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Court counsel are effective at gaining access for the interests that 
they represent. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The days of a dominant and discrete Supreme Court bar are 
long gone. Its absence, however, does not necessarily imply that 
there are no Supreme Court practitioners; the evidence suggests 
that there is a modem analogue. Within the Washington commu-
nity can be found a wealth of experienced Supreme Court talent. 
To be sure, much of that talent is drawn from the ranks of the 
federal government, but Washington's contribution to the bar of 
the Court goes substantially beyond that. The capital's bar is also 
rich with valuable experience: clerkships at the Court, tenure in 
the Solicitor General's office, and practice in the established law 
firms, all combined with active involvement in the Court's 
docket. It is these lawyers who are regarded by their brethren as 
members of the Supreme Court bar. 
Like many within the Washington community, these practi-
tioners value their credibility and thus help to provide access to 
governmental decision makers. Indeed, those with noted exper-
tise who work in close proximity to the Court serve as gatekeep-
ers, substantially improving the odds of the Justices granting 
plenary review to petitions. Even if the changes in the likelihood 
of review were only partly attributable to experienced Supreme 
Court lawyers, that by itself would still be important. Indeed, the 
mere association between experienced counsel and the likeli-
hood of the Court granting certiorari is a significant finding. At 
minimum, this analysis is an initial step in the direction of assess-
ing the role of lawyers in policy making in the modem Supreme 
Court. 
